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Abstract: This article presents a signature-free distributed algorithm which builds an atomic read/write shared memory on top
of an n-process asynchronous message-passing system in which up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures. From
a conceptual point of view, this algorithm is designed to be as close as possible to the algorithm proposed by Attiya, Bar-Noy and
Dolev (JACM 1995), which builds an atomic register in an n-process asynchronous message-passing system where up to t < n/2
processes may crash. The proposed algorithm is particularly simple. It does not use cryptography to cope with Byzantine processes,
and is optimal from a t-resilience point of view (t < n/3). A read operation requires O(n) messages, and a write operation requires
O(n2) messages.
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1 Introduction
Shared memory abstraction on top of a message-passing system Informatics is a science of abstractions, and accordingly (as
in sequential computing) the writing of distributed applications can be greatly facilitated by the design and the use of underlying
appropriate abstractions.
This paper considers the design of such an abstraction, namely an atomic read/write memory, on top of an asynchronous message-
passing distributed system made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may commit failures. The case of crash failures was
solved by Attiya, Bar-Noy and Dolev in [3] (a) where it is shown that t < n/2 is an upper bound for the model parameter t, and (b)
where a simple, elegant, and t-resilient optimal algorithm is proposed. This algorithm is called ABD in the following.
This paper focuses on the case where processes may commit Byzantine failures, i.e., may behave in a way that does not respect
their intended behavior (as defined by their specification).
Related work Considering the clients/servers distributed model, several articles have addressed the design of servers implement-
ing a shared memory accessible by clients. The servers are usually managing a set of disks (e.g., [8, 13, 18]). Moreover, while they
consider that some servers can be Byzantine, some articles restrict the failure type allowed to clients. As an example, [9, 10] explore
the efficiency issues (relation between resilience and fast reads) in the context where only servers can be Byzantine, while clients
(the single writer and the readers) can fail by crashing. As other examples, [13] considers that clients can only commit crash failures,
while [4] considers that clients can only be “semi-Byzantine” (i.e., they can issue a bounded number of faulty writes, but otherwise
respect their code). The algorithm presented in [17] allows clients and some number of servers to be Byzantine, but requires clients to
sign their messages. As far as we know, [1] was the first paper considering Byzantine readers while still offering maximal resilience
(with respect to the number of Byzantine servers) without using cryptography. However, the writer can fail only by crashing, and the
fact that a –possibly Byzantine– reader does not write a fake value in a register (to ensure the “reader have to write” rule required to
implement atomicity) is insured only with some probability.
In the peer-to-peer model (defined here as a model in which all processes are “equal”), the construction of an atomic register
requires that each process manages a copy the register that is built. The first algorithm building a read/write shared memory in a
message-passing system where processes may commit Byzantine failures is (to our knowledge) the one presented in [12]. This paper
considers the implementation of an SWMR (single-writer/multi-reader) atomic register. It also shows that t < n/3 is an upper bound
the resilience parameter t for such a construction. In this algorithm, each SWMR atomic read/write register is represented, at each
process, by the full history of all its modifications.
The fact that an SWMR register is considered is due to the following observation: as a Byzantine process can corrupt any register
it can write, the design of a multi-writer/multi-reader register with non-trivial correctness guarantees is impossible in the presence
of Byzantine processes.
Content of the paper This paper presents a new algorithm implementing an array of n SWMR atomic read/write registers (one
per process) in an asynchronous message-passing system where up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures. This
algorithm does not require to enrich the underlying system with cryptography-based techniques.
When designing this algorithm, an aim was to obtain an algorithm whose “spirit” is ”as close as possible” to ABD. We think
that this is important from both understanding and pedagogical point of views. It helps better understand the “gap” between crash
failures and Byzantine failures. From an algorithmic point of view, we have the following:
• With respect to the algorithm described in [12], the proposed algorithm requires a process to store only a single pair (value,
sequence number) per atomic register.
• With respect to ABD, there are two main differences:
– One is the way processes implement the “reads have to write” requirement needed to obtain the atomicity property of a
register [16].
– The other one lies in the broadcast operation used to disseminate new values. While a simple unreliable broadcast1 is
sufficient in the presence of process crash failures, a stronger broadcast needs to be used to cope with Byzantine processes
in a signature-free system.
The resulting algorithm is particularly simple. Moreover, when considering the non-faulty processes, a read costs O(n) messages
and a write costs O(n2) messages.
1This broadcast is a simple send of the same message to all processes. If a process crashes during its execution, it is possible that only a subset of the processes
receive the message.
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Roadmap The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model, and the underlying reliable broadcast
abstraction. Section 3 presents a specification of an SWMR read/write atomic register in the presence of Byzantine processes. Then,
Section 4 presents the algorithm, and Section 5 proves its correctness. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Computation model
2.1 Process model, communication model, and failure model
Computing entities The system is made up of a set Π of n sequential processes, denoted p1, p2, ..., pn. These processes are
asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be arbitrary and remains always unknown to the
other processes.
Communication model The processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages through bi-directional channels. The commu-
nication network is a complete network, which means that each process pi can directly send a message to any process pj (including
itself). It is assumed that the Byzantine processes cannot control the network, hence when a process receives a message, it can unam-
biguously identify its sender. Each channel is reliable (no loss, corruption, or creation of messages), not necessarily first-in/first-out,
and asynchronous (while the transit time of each message is finite, there is no upper bound bound on message transit times).
A process pi invokes the operation “send TAG(m) to pj” to send the message tagged TAG and carrying the value m. It receives
a message tagged TAG by invoking the operation “receive TAG()”. “broadcast TAG(m)” is a macro-operation that expands as “for
each j ∈ {1, · · · , n} send TAG(m) to pj end for”. (The sending order is arbitrary, which means that, if the sender crashes while
executing this statement, an arbitrary subset of processes of processes will receive the message.)
Byzantine failures The model parameter t is an upper bound on the number of processes that can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [14,
21]. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages,
start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message
m to all the processes, can send a message m1 to some processes, a different message m2 to another subset of processes, and
no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, while they cannot modify the content of the messages sent by non-Byzantine
processes, they can read their content and reorder their deliveries. More generally, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the
computation.
A Byzantine process is also called a faulty process. A process that commits no failure (i.e., a non-Byzantine process) is also
called a correct process.
Notation In the following, the previous computation model, restricted to the case where t < n/3, is denoted BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
2.2 Reliable broadcast abstraction
This section presents a reliable broadcast abstraction (denoted r-broadcast) that will be used to build a read/write register (Section 4).
This abstraction is a simple generalization of a reliable broadcast due to Bracha [6]. While Bracha’s abstraction is for a single
broadcast, the proposed abstraction considers that each process can issue a sequence of broadcasts. It is shown in [6] that t < n/3 is
a necessary requirement to cope with the net effect of asynchrony and Byzantine failures.
Specification The reliable broadcast abstraction is defined by two operations denoted R_broadcast() and R_deliver(). When a
process pi invokes R_broadcast() we say that “pi r-broadcasts a value”. Similarly, when pi returns from an invocation of R_deliver()
and obtains a value, we say “pi r-delivers a value”.
The operation R_broadcast() has two input parameters: a broadcast value v, and an integer sn, which is a local sequence number
used to identify the successive r-broadcasts issued by each process pi. The sequence of numbers used by each (correct) process is
the increasing sequence of consecutive integers.
• RB-Validity. If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from a correct process pi, then pi invoked the operationR_broadcast(v, sn).
• RB-Integrity. Given any process pi, a correct process r-delivers at most once a pair (−, sn) from pi.
• RB-Uniformity. If a correct process r-delivers a pair (v, sn) from pi (possibly faulty), then all the correct processes eventually
r-deliver the same pair (v, sn) from pi.
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• RB-Termination. If the process that invokes R_broadcast(v, sn) is correct, all the correct processes eventually r-deliver the
pair (v, sn).
RB-Validity is on correct processes and relates their outputs to their inputs, namely no correct process r-delivers spurious messages
from correct processes. RB-Integrity states that there is no r-broadcast duplication. RB-Uniformity is an “all or none” property (it is
not possible for a pair to be delivered by a correct process and to be never delivered by the other correct processes). RB-Termination
is a liveness property: at least all the pairs r-broadcast by correct processes are r-delivered by them.
For completeness, an algorithm (due to Bracha [6]), which implements the r-broadcast abstraction in the model BAMPn,t[t <
n/3], is described in Appendix A.
3 Atomic Read/Write Registers in the Presence of Byzantine Processes
3.1 Definitions and specification
Single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) registers The fault-tolerant shared memory supplied to the upper abstraction layer is an
array denoted REG [1..n]. For each i, REG [i] is a single-writer/multi-reader (SWMR) register. This means that REG [i] can be
written only by pi. To that end, pi invokes the operation REG[i].write(v) where v is the value it wants to write into REG[i].
Differently, any process pj can read REG[i]. It invokes then the operation REG[i].read().
As already noticed in the Introduction, the “single-writer” requirement is natural in the presence of Byzantine processes. If
registers could be written by any process, it would be possible for the Byzantine processes to pollute the whole memory, and no
non-trivial computation could be possible.
On write operations by Byzantine processes A Byzantine process pk may invoke the write operation REG[k].write() to assign
a new value to REG[k], but it may also try to modify REG[k] without using this operation. In such a case, its fraudulent attempt
to modify REG [k] may succeed or not. If it succeeds, the corresponding modification of REG[k] is considered (from an external
observer’s point of view) as if it has been produced by an invocation of REG [k].write()2. This is because no correct process can
distinguish such a modification of REG[k] from a call to the write operation by pk. Let us nevertheless notice that this does not
prevent the fact that the value assigned to REG [k] can be a fake value. Moreover, at the abstraction level defined by REG[1..n], as
pk is sequential, its modifications of REG[k] appear as if they have been executed sequentially.
Definitions
• A sequence of values, denoted Hi, is associated with each register REG[i]. Hi is the sequence of values written in REG[i].
Let Hi[x] denote the xth element of Hi.
• The following notations are used.
– Let pi be a correct process. read[i, j, x]: execution of REG [j].read() returning Hi[x].
– write[i, x]: xth update of REG[i] by pi. Hence, write[i, x] defines the value of Hi[x].
If pi is a correct process, write[i, x] corresponds to an execution of REG[i].write(). If pi is Byzantine, according to the
previous discussion, these “write[i, x]” capture all the modifications of REG[i] by pi, be them associated with a call to
the write operation or not. (Let us remember that, at this abstraction level, any process is sequential.)
Specification
The correct behavior of the array of registers REG [1..n] is defined by the following set of properties.
• Termination (liveness). Let pi be a correct process.
– Each invocation of REG[i].write() terminates.
– For any j, any invocation of REG[j].read() by pi terminates.
• Consistency (safety)3. Let pi and pj be correct processes and pk any process.
– Read followed by write: (read[i, k, x] terminates before write[k, y] starts) ⇒ (x < y).
2As we will see, at the operational level, when a modification of REG[i] by a Byzantine process pi succeeds, the underlying messages generated by pi could
have been sent by a correct implementation of the operation write().
3It would be possible to associate a start event and an end event with each read[i, j, x] and each write[i, y] issued by a correct process, and a start event with
each write[j, y] issued by a Byzantine process, so that all these events define a total order from which the notion of “terminates before” could be formally defined
(as in [11, 15, 23]). To not overload the presentation, we do not use this formalization here.
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– Write followed by read: (write[j, x] terminates before read[i, j, y] starts) ⇒ (x ≤ y).4
– No read inversion: (read[i, k, x] terminates before read[j, k, y] starts) ⇒ (x ≤ y).
As there is no way to constrain the behavior of a Byzantine process, the termination property is only on correct processes, and
there is no requirement on the value returned by a read issued by a Byzantine process. The safety property concerns only the values
read by correct processes. The first property states that there is no read from the future, while the second property states that no
read can obtain an overwritten value. Due to the possible concurrent accesses to a same register, these two properties actually
defines a regular register [15]. Hence the “no read inversion” property, which allows to obtain an atomic register from a regular
register [7, 15, 23].
3.2 Linearizability
Atomic registers were formally defined in [15, 19]. Then, the atomicity concept was extended to any concurrent object defined by
a sequential specification under the name linearizability [11]. Hence in our context, the terms “atomic register” and “linearizable
register” are synonymous. The properties provided by linearizability are investigated in [11].
Definition Given a register REG[i], linearizability [11] means that it is possible to totally order the executions of its read and
write operations in such a way that (a) each operation appears as if it has been executed at a single point of the time line between its
start event and its end event, (b) no two operation executions appear at the same point, and (c) each read operation returns the value
written by the closest write operation that precedes it in the sequence (or the initial value if there is no such write operation).
A register is linearizable if its operations satisfy the previous items (a), (b), and (c). The linearization point of an operation is
the point of the timeline at which this operation appears to have been instantaneously executed.
An important property of Linearizability An important theorem associated with linearizability is the following [11]: If each
object (here a register) is linearizable, then the set of all the objects, considered as a single object, is linearizable. This means that
linearizable objects compose for free.
Theorem 1 The register specification defined in Section 3 defines atomic (linearizable) registers.
Proof As linearizable (atomic) objects compose for free [11], it is sufficient to consider a single register and, starting from its
specification defined in Section 3.1, show that it is linearizable.
Let REG[i] be a register. Let Hi be the sequence of values written by pi in REG [i].5 The proof consists in building a sequence
Si which (a) includes all the read operations of REG[i] issued by the correct processes plus the writes of REG[i] issued by pi, and
(b) satisfies the definition of linearizability.
To simplify and without loss of generality, let us assume that there is an initial write that gives REG [i] its initial value. Let us
start with Si being the sequence of write operations that produced the sequence Hi.
Let read[j, i, x] be a read operation issued by a correct process pj . Let write[i, a] be the last write of REG[i] that terminates
before read[j, i, x] starts. Let write[i, a+1], ..., write[i, a+c] be (if any) the writes of REG [i] that are concurrent with read[j, i, x].
If there is no such writes c = 0. Let b = c + 1. Hence, if any, write[i, b] is the first write of REG[i] starting after read[j, i, x] has
terminated. We have the following.
• It follows that from the properties “read followed by write” and “write followed by read” that x ∈ {a, a+ 1, ..., a+ c}.
• It follows from the “no read inversion” property that if read[ℓ, i, x′] (issued a correct process pℓ) starts after read[j, i, x], we
have x ≤ x′.
The operation read[j, i, x] is added to Si just after write[i, x]. It there are two (or more) operations read[j1, i, x] and read[j2, i, x]
issued by correct processes, they are placed one after the other in the sequence Si. All the read operations issued by the correct
processes are added to Si as described.
It is easy to see that the execution associated with Si is linearizable (i.e., satisfies the items (a), (b), and (c) stated above).
✷Theorem 1
4Let us notice that this property considers that the write of REG[j] is issued by a correct process. This is because it is not always possible to define when the
modification of REG[j] has terminated when pj is Byzantine.
5As we have seen, if pi is Byzantine, this sequence contains all the modifications of REG[i] which cannot be distinguished by the correct processes from
invocations of REG[i].write() by pi.
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4 Construction of Single-Writer/Multi-Reader Atomic Registers
An algorithm constructing an SWMR atomic (linearizable) register in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes, is described in
Figure 1. As it assumes t < n/3, this algorithm is suited for the computing model BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. The algorithm presents the
code associated with a correct process pi.
The design of the algorithm strives to be as close as possible to the ABD algorithm [3], which implements an atomic register
in an asynchronous system where at most t < n/2 may crash.6 It uses a wait(condition) statement. The corresponding process is
blocked until the predicate condition becomes satisfied. While a process is blocked, it can process the messages it receives.
Local variables Each process pi manages the following local variables whose scope is the full computation (local variables are
denoted with lower case letters, and sub-scripted by the process index i).
• regi[1..n] is the local representation of the array REG[1..n] of atomic SWMR registers. Each local register regi[j] contains
two fields, a sequence number regi[j].sn, and the corresponding value regi[j].val. It is initialized to the pair 〈initj, 0〉, where
initj is the initial value of REG[j].
• wsni is an integer, initialized to 0, used by pi to associate sequence numbers with its successive write invocations.
• rsni[1..n] is an array of sequence numbers (initialized to [0, · · · , 0]) such that sni[j] is used by pi to identify its successive
read invocations of REG[j].7
The operation REG[i].write(v) This operation is implemented by the client lines 1-4 and the server lines 11-12 (which are similar
to the algorithm implementing a write operation in a crash-prone system [3]).
Process pi first increases wsni and r-broadcasts the message WRITE(v, wsni). Let us remark that this is the only use of the
reliable broadcast abstraction by the algorithm. The process pi then waits for acknowledgments (message WRITE_DONE(v, wsni))
from (n − t) distinct processes, and finally terminates the write operation. As we will see (Lemma 2), the intersection of any
two quorums of (n − t) processes contains at least (t + 1) correct processes. This intersection property will be used to prove the
consistency of the register REG[i].
When pi r-delivers a message WRITE(v, wsn) from a process pj , it waits until wsn = regi[j] + 1 (line 12). Hence, whatever
the sender pj , its messages WRITE() are processed in their sending order. When this predicate becomes true, pi updates accordingly
its local with respect to REG[j] (line 13), and sends back to pj an acknowledgment to inform it that its new write has locally been
taken into account (line 14).
Write of REG[j] by a Byzantine process pj Let us observe that the only way for a process pi to modify regi[j] is to r-deliver a
message WRITE(v, wsn) from a (correct or faulty) process pj . Due to the RB-Uniformity of the r-broadcast abstraction, it follows
that, if a correct process pi r-delivers such a message, all correct processes will r-deliver the same message, be its sender correct or
faulty. Consequently each of them will eventually execute the statements of lines 12-14.
Hence, when a faulty process invokes R_broadcast WRITE(v, wsn) (be the r-broadcast invocation involved in an invocation of
REG [j].write(v) or not), its faulty behavior is restricted to broadcast fake values for v and wsn.
The operation REG[j].read() This operation is implemented by the client lines 5-11 and the server line 15. The corresponding
algorithm is the core of the implementation of an SWMR atomic register.
When pi wants to read REG [j], it first broadcasts a read request (message READ(j, rsni[j])), and waits for corresponding
acknowledgments (message STATE(rsni[j],−)). Each of these acknowledgment carries the sequence number associated with the
current value of REG [j], as known by the sender of the message (line 15). For pi to progress, the wait predicate (line 7) states that
its local representation of REG[j], namely regi[j], must be fresh enough (let us remember that the only line where regi[j] can be
modified is line 13, i.e., when pi r-delivers a message WRITE(−,−) from pj). This freshness predicate states that pi’s current value
of regi[j] is as fresh as the current value of at least (n − t) processes (i.e., at least (n − 2t) correct processes). If the freshness
predicate is false, it will become true when pi will have r-delivered WRITE(−,−) messages, which have been r-delivered by other
correct processes, but not yet by it.
When this waiting period terminates, pi considers the current value 〈w,wsn〉 of regi[j] (line 8). It then broadcasts the message
CATCH_UP(j, wsn), and returns the value w as soon as its message CATCH_UP() is acknowledged by (n− t) processes (lines 9-10).
The aim of the CATCH_UP(j, wsn) message is to allow each destination process pk to have a value in its local representation
of REG[j] (namely regk[j].val) at least as recent as the one whose sequence number is wsn (line 15). The aim of this value
6In addition to the stronger necessary and sufficient condition t < n/3, this presentation style allows people aware of the ABD algorithm to see the additional
statements needed to go from crash failures to Byzantine behavior.
7If we assume that no correct process pi reads its own register REG[i], rsni[i] can be used to store wsni.
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local variables initialization:
regi[1..n]← [〈init0, 0〉, . . . , 〈initn, 0〉]; wsni ← 0; rsni[1..n]← [0, · · · , 0].
%————————————————————————————————-
operation REG[i].write(v) is
(1) wsni ← wsni + 1;
(2) R_broadcast WRITE(v,wsni);
(3) wait WRITE_DONE(wsni) received from (n− t) different processes;
(4) return()
end operation.
operation REG[j].read() is
(5) rsni[j]← rsni[j] + 1;
(6) broadcast READ(j, rsni[j]);
(7) wait (regi[j].sn ≥ max(wsn1, ...,wsnn−t) where wsn1, ...,wsnn−t are from
messages STATE(rsni[j],−) received from n− t different processes
)
;
(8) let 〈w,wsn〉 the value of regi[j] which allows the previous wait to terminate;
(9) broadcast CATCH_UP(j,wsn);
(10) wait (CATCH_UP_DONE(j,wsn) received from (n− t) different processes);
(11) return(w)
end operation.
%————————————————————————————————-
when a message WRITE(v,wsn) is R_delivered from pj do
(12) wait(wsn = regi[j].sn+ 1);
(13) regi[j]← 〈v, wsn〉;
(14) send WRITE_DONE(wsn) to pj .
when a message READ(j, rsn) is received from pk do
(15) send STATE(rsn,regi[j].sn) to pk .
when a message CATCH_UP(j,wsn) is received from pk do
(16) wait (regi[j].sn ≥ wsn);
(17) send CATCH_UP_DONE(j,wsn) to pk.
Figure 1: Atomic SWMR Registers in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] (code for process pi)
resynchronization is to prevent read inversions. When pi has received the (n − t) acknowledgments it was waiting for (line 10), it
knows that no other correct process can obtain a value older than the value w it returns.
Message cost of the algorithm In addition to a reliable broadcast (whose message cost is O(n2)), a write operation generates n
messages WRITE_DONE. Hence the cost of a write is O(n2) message. A read operation cost 4n messages, n messages for each of
the four kinds of messages READ, STATE, CATCH_UP and catch_up_done.
Comparing with the crash failure model It is known that the algorithms implementing an atomic register on top of an asyn-
chronous message-passing system prone to process crashes, require that “reads have to write” [2, 3, 5, 16, 22]. More precisely,
before returning a value, in one way or another, a reader must write this value to ensure atomicity (otherwise, we have only a “reg-
ular” register [15]). Doing so, it is not possible that two sequential read invocations, concurrent with one or more write invocations,
be such that the first read obtains a value while the second read obtains older value (this prevents read inversion).
As Byzantine failures are more severe than crash failures, the algorithm of Figure 1 needs to use a mechanism analogous to the
“reads have to write” to prevent read inversions from occurring. As previously indicated, This is done by the messages CATCH_UP()
broadcast at line 9 and the associated acknowledgments messages CATCH_UP_DONE() received at line 10. As previously indicated,
these messages realize a synchronization during which (n−t) processes (i.e., at least (n−2t) correct processes) have resynchronized
their value, if needed (line 15).
A comparison of two instances of the ABD algorithm [3] and the algorithm of Figure 1 is presented in Table 1. The first instance
is the version of the ABD algorithm which builds an array of n SWMR (single-writer/multi-reader) atomic registers (one register per
process). The second instance is the version of the ABD algorithm which builds a single MWMR (multi-writer/multi-reader) atomic
register.
As they depend on the application and not on the algorithm, the size of the values which are written is considered as constant.
The parameters n and t have the same meaning as before; m denotes an upper bound on the number of read and write operations
on each register. The value log n is due to the fact that a message carries a constant number of process identities. Similarly, logm
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is due to the fact that (a) a message carries a constant number of sequence numbers, and (b) there is a constant number of message
tags (including the underlying reliable broadcast).
algorithm failure type requirement msgs/write msgs/read msg size local mem./proc.
ABD: n SWMR crash t < n/2 O(n) O(n) O(log n+ logm) O(n logm)
ABD: 1 MWMR crash t < n/2 O(n) O(n) O(log n+ logm) O(n logm)
Fig. 1: n SWMR Byzantine t < n/3 O(n2) O(n) O(log n+ logm) O(n logm)
Table 1: Crash vs Byzantine failures: cost comparisons
5 Proof of the construction
The model assumption n > 3t is implicit in all the statements and proofs that follow.
5.1 Preliminary lemmas
Lemma 1 If a correct process pi r-delivers a message WRITE(w, sn) (from a correct or faulty process), any correct process r-
delivers it.
Proof This is an immediate consequence of the RB-Uniformity property of the the r-broadcast abstraction. ✷Lemma 1
Lemma 2 Any two sets (quorums) of (n− t) processes have at least on correct process in their intersection.
Proof Let Q1 and Q2 be two sets of processes such that |Q1| = |Q2| = n− t. In the worst case, the t processes that are not in Q1
belong to Q2, and the t processes that are not in Q2 belong to Q1. It follows that |Q1 ∩ Q2| ≥ n − 2t. As n > 3t, it follows that
|Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ n− 2t ≥ t+ 1, which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷Lemma 2
5.2 Proof of the termination properties
Lemma 3 Let pi be a correct process. Any invocation of REG[i].write() terminates.
Proof Let us consider the first invocation of REG[i].write() by a correct process pi. This write operation generates the r-broadcast
of message WRITE(−, 1) (lines 1-2). Due to Lemma 1, all correct processes r-deliver this message, and the waiting predicate of
line 13 is eventually satisfied. Consequently, each correct process pk eventually sets regk[i].sn to 1, and sends back to pi an
acknowledgment message WRITE_DONE(1). As there are least (n − t) correct processes, pi receives such acknowledgments from
at least (n− t) different processes, and terminates its first invocation (lines 3-4).
As, for any given any process pj , all correct processes process the messages WRITE() from pj in their sequence order, the lemma
follows from a simple induction (whose previous paragraph is the proof of the base case).
✷Lemma 3
Lemma 4 Let pi be a correct process. For any j, any invocation of REG[j].read() terminates.
Proof When a correct process pi invokes REG [j].read(), it broadcasts a message READ(j, rsn) where rsn is a new sequence
number (lines 5-6). Then, it waits until the freshness predicate of line 7 becomes satisfied. As pi is correct, each correct process
pk receives READ(j, rsn), and sends back to pi a message STATE(rsn, wsn), where wsn is the sequence number of the last value
of REG[j] it knows (line 15). It follows that pi receives a message STATE(j,−) from at least (n − t) correct processes. Let
STATE(j, wsn1), · · · , STATE(j, wsnn−t) be these messages.
To show that the wait of line 7 terminates we have to show that the freshness predicate regi[j].sn ≥ max(wsn1, · · · , wsnn−t)
is eventually satisfied. Let wsn be one of the previous sequence number, and pk the correct process that send it. This means that
regk[j].sn = wsn (line 15), from which we conclude (as pk is correct) that pk has previously r-delivered a message WRITE(−, wsn)
and updated accordingly regk[j] at line 13 (let us remember that this is the only line at which the local register regk[j] is updated).
It follows from Lemma 1 that eventually pi r-delivers the message WRITE(−, sn). It follows then from line 13 that eventually we
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have regi[j].sn ≥ sn. As this is true for any sequence number in {wsn1, ..., wsnn−t}, it follows that the freshness predicate is
eventually satisfied, and consequently the wait statement of line 7 is satisfied.
Let us now consider the wait statement of line 10, which appears after pi has broadcast the message CATCH_UP(j, wsn), where
wsn = regi[j].sn (sequence number in regi[j] just after pi stopped waiting at line 7). We show that any correct process sends back
to pi an acknowledgment CATCH_UP_DONE(j, wsn) at line 17. Process pi updated regi[j].sn to wsn at line 13, and this occurred
when it r-delivered a message WRITE(−, wsn). The reasoning is the same as in the previous paragraph, namely, it follows from
Lemma 1 that all correct processes r-deliver this message and consequently we have regk[j].sn ≥ wsn at every correct process pk.
Hence, the value resynchronization predicate of line 16 is eventually satisfied at all correct processes, that consequently sends back
a message CATCH_UP_DONE(j, wsn) at line 17, which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷Lemma 4
5.3 Proofs of the consistency (atomicity) properties
The next lemma shows that a sequence Hi, as defined in Section 3, can be associated with each register REG[i].
Lemma 5 Given any register REG[i], there is a sequence of values Hi such that, if pi is correct, Hi is the sequence of values
written by pi.
Proof Let us define Hi as follows. Let us consider all the messages WRITE(−, sn) r-delivered from a (correct or faulty) process
pi by the correct processes (due to Lemma 1, these messages are r-delivered to all correct processes). Let us order these messages
according to their processing order as defined by the predicate of line 12. Hi is the corresponding sequence of values. (Let us notice
that, if pi is Byzantine, it is possible that some of its messages WRITE() are r-delivered but never processed at line 14; if any, such
messages are never added to Hi).
Let us now consider the case where pi is correct. It follows from the RB-Validity property of the r-broadcast abstraction that any
message r-delivered from pi, was r-broadcast by pi. It then follows from lines 1-2 that Hi is the sequence of values written by pi.
✷Lemma 5
Lemma 6 Let pi be a correct process. If read[i, j, x] terminates before write[j, y] starts, we have x < y.
Proof Let pi a correct process that returns value v from the invocation of REG[j].read(). Let regi[j] = 〈v, x〉 the pair obtained by
pi at line 8, i.e., v = Hj [x] and regi[j].sn ≥ x when read[i, j, x] terminates.
As write[j, y] defines Hj [y], it follows that a message WRITE(−, y) is r-delivered from pj at each correct process pk which
executes regk[j]← 〈−, y〉 at line 13. As this occurs after read[i, j, x] has terminated, we necessarily have x < y. ✷Lemma 6
Lemma 7 Let pi and pj be correct processes. If write[i, x] terminates before read[j, i, y] starts, we have x ≤ y.
Proof Let pi a correct process that returns from its xth invocation of REG[i].write(). It follows from line 1 that the sequence
number x is associated with the written value. It follows from the r-broadcast of the message WRITE(v, x) issued by pi (line 2), and
its r-delivery (line 12) at each correct process (RB-uniformity of the r-broadcast), that pi receives (n− t) messages WRITE_DONE(x)
(line 3). Let Q1 be this set of (n− t) processes that sent these messages (line 14). Let us notice that there are at least (n−2t) correct
processes in Q1 and, due to line 13, any of them, say pk, is such that regk[i].sn ≥ x.
Let pj be a correct process that invokes REG[i].read(). The freshness predicate of line 7 blocks pj until regj [i].sn ≥
max(wsn1, ..., wsnn−t). Let Q2 be the set of the (n − t) processes that sent the messages STATE() (line 15) which allowed pj
to exit the wait statement of line 7.
It follows from Lemma 2 that at least one correct process pk belongs to Q1 ∩Q2. Hence, when pi returns from REG[i].write()
it received the message WRITE_DONE(x) from pk, and we have then regk[i].sn ≥ x. As REG[i].read() by pj started after
REG [i].write() by pi terminated, when pk sends to pj the message STATE(−, regk[i].sn), we have regk[i].sn ≥ x. It follows
that, when pj exits the wait statement of line 8 we have regj [i].sn ≥ x, which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷Lemma 7
Lemma 8 Let pi and pj be two correct processes. If read[i, k, x] terminates before read[j, k, y] starts, we have x ≤ y.
Proof Let us consider process pi. When it terminates read[i, k, x], if follows from the messages CATCH_UP() and CATCH_UP_DONE()
(lines 9-10 and lines 16-17) that pi received the acknowledgment message CATCH_UP_DONE(k, x) from (n− t) different processes.
Let Q1 be this set of (n − t) processes. Let us notice that there are at least (n − 2t) correct processes in Q1, and for each of them,
say pℓ, we have regℓ[k].sn ≥ x.
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When pj invokes REG[k].read() it broadcasts the message READ() and waits until the freshness predicate is satisfied (lines 7).
The messages STATE(−,−) it receives are from (n− t) different processes. Let Q2 be this set of (n− t) processes.
It follows from Lemma 2 that at least one correct process pℓ belongs to Q1 ∩ Q2. According to the fact that read[i, k, x]
terminates before read[j, k, y] starts, it follows that pℓ sent CATCH_UP_DONE(k, x) to pi before sending the message STATE(−, s)
to pj . As regℓ[k].sn never decreases, it follows that x ≤ s. It finally follows that, when the freshness predicate is satisfied at pj , we
have regj [k].sn ≥ s. As y = regj [k].sn (lines 8-11), it follows that x ≤ y, which concludes the proof. ✷Lemma 8
5.4 Piecing together the lemmas
Theorem 2 The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements an array of n SWMR atomic (linearizable) registers (one register per
process) in the system model BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Proof The proof follows from Lemmas 3-8 and Theorem 1. ✷Theorem 2
6 Conclusion
This paper presented a signature-free algorithm building an array of n single-writer/multi-reader atomic registers (with a register per
process) in an n-process asynchronous message-passing system where up to t < n/3 processes may commit Byzantine failures.
This algorithm relies on an underlying reliable broadcast [6], an appropriate freshness predicate and a value resynchronization
mechanism which ensure that a correct process always reads up-to-date values. A noteworthy property of this algorithm lies in its
conceptual simplicity.
According to the result of [12] this algorithm is optimal from a t-resilience point of view. While the cost of a read operation
is linear with respect to n, a problem which remains open lies in its O(n2) message complexity for write operations. This cost is
due to the use of a Byzantine-tolerant reliable broadcast. Hence the question: Is it possible to reduce it, or is O(n2) a lower bound
when one has to implement an atomic register in a signature-free message-passing distributed system prone to Byzantine failures?
We conjecture it is a lower bound.
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A A Reliable Broadcast Algorithm
The r-broadcast algorithm presented in Figure 2 is Bracha’s algorithm [6] enriched with sequence numbers. Each process pi manages
a local array nexti[1..n], where nexti[j] is the sequence number sn of the next application message (namely, APP(−, sn)) from pj ,
that pi will process (line 3). Initially, for all i, j, nexti[j] = 1.
When a process pi invokes R_broadcast APP(v, sn), it broadcasts the message APP(v, sn) (line 1) where sn is its next sequence
number. On its “server” role, the behavior of a process pi is as follows.
• When a process pi receives a message APP(v, sn) from a process pj for the first time, it first waits until it can process this
message (line 3). Process pi then broadcasts a message ECHO(j, v, sn) (line 4). If the message just received is not the first
message APP(−, sn), pj is Byzantine and the message is discarded.
• Then, when pi has received the same message ECHO(j, v, sn) from “enough” processes (where “enough” means “more than
(n+ t)/2 different processes”), and has not yet broadcast a message READY(j, v, sn), it does it (lines 6-9).
The aim of (a) the messages ECHO(j, v, sn), and (b) the cardinality “greater than (n + t)/2 processes”, is to ensure that no
two correct processes can r-deliver distinct messages from pj (in the case where pj is Byzantine). The aim of the messages
READY(j, v, sn) is related to the liveness of the algorithm. Namely, its aim is to allow (at least when pj is correct) the r-
delivery by the correct processes of the very same message APP(v, sn) from pj , and this must always occur if pj is correct. It
is nevertheless possible that a message r-broadcast by a Byzantine process pj be never r-delivered by the correct processes.
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operation R_broadcast APP(v, sn):
(1) broadcast APP(v, sn).
when a message APP(v, sn) from pj is received:
(2) if no message APP(−, sn)) received from pj
(3) then wait (nexti[j] = sn);
(4) broadcast ECHO(j, v, sn)
(5) end if.
when a message ECHO(j, v, sn) is received:
(6) if ECHO(j, v, sn) received from strictly more than n+t
2
different processes
(7) ∧ READY(j, v, sn) never sent
(8) then broadcast READY(j, v, sn)
(9) end if.
when a message READY(j, v, sn) is received:
(10) if READY(j, v, sn) received from at least t+ 1 different processes
(11) ∧ READY(j, v, sn) never sent
(12) then broadcast READY(j, v, sn)
(13) end if;
(14) if READY(j, v, sn) received from at least 2t+ 1 different processes
(15) ∧ APP(v, sn) by pj never R_delivered
(16) then R_deliver APP(v, sn) from pj ;
(17) nexti[j]← nexti[j] + 1
(18) end if.
Figure 2: Reliable Broadcast in BAMPn,t[t < n/3], (code for process pi)
• Finally, when pi has received the message READY(j, v, sn) from (t + 1) different processes, it broadcasts the same message
READY(j, v, sn), it not yet done. This is required to ensure the RB-termination property. If pi has received “enough” mes-
sages READY(j, v, sn) (as before “enough” means “from more than (n+ t)/2 different processes”), it r-delivers the message
APP(v, sn) r-broadcast by pj .
Proofs that this algorithm satisfies the properties defining the reliable broadcast abstraction can be found in [6, 20].
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